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II regulation – Fundamental freedoms vs right to strike – National parliaments’ 
reasoned opinions – Politicising subsidiarity – Political constitutionalism – Repre-
sentativity – A political interpretation of the Early Warning System – National 
parliaments as guardians of national constitutional essentials
Introduction
The first Yellow Card issued against the Commission’s proposal for a Council 
regulation of the right to collective action1 and the following decision to withdraw 
the proposal might represent the first steps toward a more nuanced view of the 
Early Warning System (EWS). This case helps to shed a clearer light on the EWS. 
This article suggests that there could be a link between the protection of certain 
tenets of national social policies and the role of parliaments. National parliaments 
may be using the EWS also as a way to contain the social deficit caused by Euro-
pean integration, echoing what some national constitutional courts did for the 
protection of fundamental rights when they had to confront the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.
* Glasgow University; Centre for Law and Public Affairs (Academy of Science of the Czech 
Republic). A first draft of this article has been presented at the Law School of the University of 
Edinburgh, at the Law Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science and 
at CeLAPa (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic). I would like to thank the participants for 
their helpful comments and in particular, Emilios Christodoulidis, Sascha Garben, Jan Kómarek, 
Cormac MacAmhlaigh, Grégoire Webber, Michael Wilkinson, and two anonymous reviewers for 
their comments. The research for this article has been generously funded by the Academy of 
Sciences of the Czech Republic (RVO: 68378122).
1 COM(2012)130 final.
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The Early Warning System and its use
The EWS has been introduced by Protocol No. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty with the 
hope of killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the idea was to cope 
with the weak (rectius, almost non-existent) enforcement of the principle of sub-
sidiarity2 by attributing to the most affected institutions the task of checking the 
Commission’s compliance to this principle. On the other hand, the involvement 
of national parliaments in the European lawmaking process had been deemed 
necessary as a way to cope with the infamous democratic deficit. The hope of the 
drafters of, first, the Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty was to inject 
some representativity in the ascending phase of European lawmaking by coopting 
the most representative (at least from a political perspective) institutions at the 
national level. Much has already been written on the functioning of the EWS,3 so 
a brief outline of its functioning will suffice here. 
The core of the EWS is regulated by Articles 6 and 7. If there is a suspicion of 
a breach of the subsidiarity principle, each national parliament or each chamber 
of a national parliament has eight weeks4 (in the Constitutional Treaty the pe-
riod was six weeks) in which to communicate to the presidents of the European 
Commission, the European Council and the Council the reasons why it considers 
that a given legislative draft does not respect the principle of subsidiarity. Two 
procedures can emerge from this reaction. The first one is known as the ‘yellow 
card’ and is regulated by Article 7(2) of the Protocol: if a third of national parlia-
ments (two votes per country, one vote per chamber in bicameral systems) find a 
breach of the principle of subsidiarity, then the legislative draft needs to be reviewed. 
This threshold goes down to one quarter in the former justice, freedom and secu-
rity area. With the EU at 27 Member States, the one-third threshold equals 18 
votes, that are brought down to 13 if the issue concerns the area of justice, freedom 
and security.5 The Commission does not have to formally withdraw its pro-
posal and can keep the original proposal in place. But it still needs to explain its 
decision in the form of a communication. This is supposed to enhance the dialogue 
between the Commission and the national parliaments and to enrich this institu-
2 A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique (Oxford University Press 2002); 
G. Martinico, ‘Dating Cinderella: On Subsidiarity as a Political Safeguard of Federalism in the Eu-
ropean Union’, 12 European Public Law (2011) p. 649; A. Biondi, ‘Subsidiarity in the Courtroom’, 
in A. Biondi et al. (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 213-227.
3 See now the monograph by P. Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity 
(Routledge 2012).
4 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the month of August is not counted in the 
eight weeks deadline.
5 Obviously, after the accession of Croatia, Member States are 28 and therefore the threshold 
has changed. But when the first yellow card was triggered, these were the relevant thresholds.
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tional conversation with further reasons in support of the contested (or then 
modified) proposal.
The second procedure is known as the ‘orange card’ and is regulated by Article 
7(3) of the Protocol. If, for what concerns the ordinary legislative procedure, more 
than half of the national parliaments find a breach of the subsidiarity principle 
and the Commission still wants to proceed with the text unchanged, then the 
national parliaments’ opinions and the Commission’s reasoned opinion are trans-
mitted to the Union legislators. The text of the relevant alinea states that ‘where 
reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with 
the principle of subsidiarity represent at least a simple majority of the votes allo-
cated to the national parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph 1, 
the proposal must be reviewed’. This alinea requires absolute majority counted 
against all votes allocated to the national parliaments.6 In light of this clarifica-
tion, the number of votes necessary to reach the majority is 28 (out of 54). The 
Parliament and the Council have to decide on the existence (or not) of the sub-
sidiarity breach before dealing with the proposal itself. The European Parliament 
decides by a majority of votes cast on the issue. The Council requires a 55% ma-
jority of votes to decide if there is a subsidiarity breach. If any of these institutions 
shares the doubts expressed by national parliaments then the legislative process 
will be blocked.
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EWS had obviously not 
produced concrete results if one excludes an increase of awareness of (some of ) 
the national parliaments of what is happening in terms of legislative projects in 
Brussels. COSAC (the body that gathers the representatives of the European Af-
fairs Committees of the Member States) performed eight try-outs on the way to 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The outcomes, in terms of participation 
and substantive control of subsidiarity, were mixed to say the least. Nonetheless, 
COSAC provided a useful platform for national representatives for exchanging 
information and sharing points of view on the Commission’s proposals under 
scrutiny. Therefore, it was surprising and disappointing to see that after the Lisbon 
Treaty became effective, national parliaments decided to discard COSAC as the 
forum for performing the subsidiarity check and they retreated to their own na-
tional realms. The only instrument, at this stage, for exchanging information and 
best practices, apart from informal exchanges among the permanent representa-
tions in Brussels, remains IPEX, a website where the European activities of na-
tional parliaments are uploaded or documented. 
In the first couple of years, that is, in 2010 and 2011, no yellow or red card has 
been issued. Nonetheless, there has been an increase in the number of reasoned 
6 ‘The Role of National Parliaments in the EU’, FIDE proceedings, Madrid 2010, vol. 1, p. 23.
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opinions and votes cast against the Commission proposals,7 with large disparities 
among different national parliaments.8 Some legislative drafts of the Commission 
have generated a discreet amount of reasoned opinions, but the Commission has 
never formally recognised any point stressed in one of those opinions. It is not 
surprising, then, that the EWS had been considered less effective than the other 
informal channel of communication between parliaments and the Commission, 
the political initiative (known also as the Barroso initiative).9 However, at the 
end of May 2012, the Commission announced that the threshold for the yellow 
card had been met on a proposal concerning the management of the conflict be-
tween economic freedoms and labour rights.10
The Commission’s proposal and its background
As is well known, a series of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union between the end of 2007 and 2008 stirred a lot of controversy on the place 
of the right to collective action (and in particular on the right to strike) within 
European Union law.11 By reverting its previous case-law,12 this line of cases rec-
ognized that the right to collective action is part and parcel of EU law (a funda-
mental right), despite the explicit exclusion of the right to strike in Article 153(5) 
TFEU.13 Among the elements that caused debate there was the decision by the 
 7 The Commission’s figures show that in 2010 were cast 46 votes (Luxembourg and Sweden the 
more active parliaments with 6 votes) while in 2011 the votes amounted to 82 (with Sweden being 
the most active with 16 votes).
 8 The difference in activity among national parliaments confirms the observation about com-
parative parliamentary involvement in EU affairs: cf. J. O’Brennan and T. Raunio (eds.), National 
Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union: From ‘Victims’ of Integration to Competitive Actors? 
(Routledge 2007).
 9 D. Jancic, ‘The Barroso Initiative: Window-Dressing or Democracy Boost?’, 8 Utrecht Law 
Review (2012) p. 78.
10 For an introduction to the terms of the conflict see D. Novitz and P. Syrpis, ‘Economic and 
Social Rights in Contrast: Political and Judicial Approaches to Their Reconciliation’, 33 European 
Law Review (2008) p. 411-426.
11 See, at least, Viking (C-438/05) and Laval (C-341/05). The debate generated by these cases 
has produced a huge amount of literature which cannot be mentioned here. For a general over-
view and an assessment of how these cases impacted upon each national system see A. Bücker and 
W. Warnek (eds.), Reconciling Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms after Viking, Laval 
and Rüffert (Nomos 2011), p. 159-168. Cf. A. Asteriti, ‘Social Dialogue, Laval Style’, 6 European 
Journal of Legal Studies (2012) p. 59. See also, the excellent overview in F. Fabbrini, ‘Europe in Need 
of a New Deal’, 43 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2011) p. 1175.
12 ECJ 21 Sept. 1999, Case C-67/96, Albany International v. Stichting Textielindustrie.
13 However, it must be reminded that the right to collective action is explicitly recognised in 
Art. 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 06 May 2014 IP address: 130.209.6.42
94 Marco Goldoni EuConst 10 (2014)
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),14 in order to ensure the function-
ing of the common market, to design a standard of protection for the right to 
strike in cases of transnational industrial actions which is more restrictive than 
that prevailing in many Member States15 and the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR).16
The Commission, after consultations with social partners,17 and drawing from 
the report of 9 May 2010 by Mario Monti (this is why the proposal is called 
Monti II),18 proposed a Council regulation as ‘the most effective and efficient 
solution to address the specific objective of reducing tensions between national 
industrial relation systems and the freedom to provide services’.19 Therefore, the 
Commission deemed necessary to step in and clarify the status of the right to col-
lective action in cross-border contexts. In the explanatory memorandum, the 
Commission affirms that the ‘present proposal aims to clarify the general principles 
and applicable rules at EU level with respect to the exercise of the fundamental 
right to take collective action within the context of the freedom to provide ser-
vices and the freedom of establishment, including the need to reconcile them in 
practice in cross-border situations. Its scope covers not only the temporary posting 
of workers to another Member State for the cross-border provision of services but 
also any envisaged restructuring and/or relocation involving more than one Mem-
ber State’.20 The Commission decided to ground its proposal on the so-called 
flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU), which states that the Commission can pro-
pose a Council regulation when no powers have been provided by the Treaties in 
order to realise one of the essential tasks.21 Presumably, the task here is to avoid 
legal uncertainty in the single market by regulating cross-border conflicts between 
14 In the more recent case of ECJ 15 July 2010, Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, the 
Court has confirmed the doctrine established in Laval and Viking.
15 See, e.g., N. Bruun et al., ‘Consequences and Policy Perspectives in the Nordic Countries as 
a Result of Certain Important Decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU’, in Bücker and Warnek 
(eds.), supra n. 11, p. 19.
16 K. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’, 39 Industrial 
Law Journal (2010) p. 2.
17 The reactions of the social partners to the case-law of the Court have been different but Eu-
ropean trade unions and employers have either asked for modifications or clarifications. See Report 
on Joint Work of the European Social Partners on the ECJ Rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and 
Luxembourg Cases, 19 March 2010.
18 M. Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market’, 9 May 2010.
19 Commission explanatory memorandum, p. 9.
20 Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 10. 
21 Art. 352 states that ‘if action by the [EU] should prove necessary, within the framework of 
the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the [EU] Parliament, shall adopt the ap-
propriate measures’.
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fundamental freedoms and the right to collective action. In order to support this 
claim, the Commission makes reference to the Impact Assessment, which ‘identi-
fied negative economic and social impacts of the baseline scenario. Continuing 
legal uncertainty could lead to a loss if support for the single market by an impor-
tant part of the stakeholders and create an unfriendly business environment includ-
ing possibly protectionist behaviour’.22 But the Commission also states that in 
order to ‘avoid ambiguity and prevent solutions being unilaterally sought at national 
level, it is necessary to clarify a number of aspects relating in particular to the right 
to take collective action, including the right or freedom to strike, as well as the 
extent to which trade unions may defend and protect workers’ rights in cross-
border situations’. In other words, a Council regulation of this issue would block 
any national pretension to find a ‘unilateral’ solution.
As for what concerns its competence to act, it is important to bear in mind that 
the Commission is still committed to the subsidiarity test suggested by the pro-
tocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty: 
Subsidiarity cannot be easily validated by operational criteria. The Protocol, as revised 
by the Lisbon Treaty, no longer mentions conformity tests, such as ‘necessity’ and 
‘EU value added’. Instead it has shifted the application mode towards the proce-
dural aspects ensuring that all key actors can have their say. The Commission has 
continued to use ‘necessity’ and ‘EU value added’ tests as part of its analytical frame-
work and recommends the other actors to do likewise.23 
EU added value of the proposal would reside in the danger of the rise of protec-
tionist behaviour which would unduly limit the fundamental freedoms and, on 
the side of the right to strike, ‘the risk of damage claims and doubts regarding the 
role of national courts could prevent trade unions from exercising their right to 
strike’.24
The Commission’s reasoning basically accepts the starting point of the CJEU,25 
that is, it begins by accepting the application of the principle of proportionality 
in case of conflict between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. In fact, 
the core provision of the proposed regulation is Article 2 which states that ‘the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services 
enshrined in the Treaty shall respect the fundamental right to take collective action, 
including the right or freedom to strike, and conversely, the exercise of the 
22 Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 14.
23 European Commission, Report on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 2011, p. 3.
24 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 2.
25 See the analysis focused on Arts. 1 and 2 of the proposal by M. Rocca, ‘The Proposal for 
a (So-called) Monti II Regulation on the Exercise to Take Collective Action within the Context 
of the Freedom of Movement and Freedom of Establishment’, 3 European Journal of Labour Law 
(2012) p. 19.
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fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to 
strike, shall respect these economic freedoms’.26 This is affirmed as part of a rath-
er ‘irenic’ conception of the relation between economic freedom and right to 
collective action, as it is affirmed in the explanatory memorandum: ‘while reiterat-
ing that there is no inherent conflict between the exercise of the fundamental right 
to take collective action and the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services enshrined in and protected by the Treaty, with no primacy of one 
over the other, Article 2 recognizes that situations may arise where their exercise 
may have to be reconciled in cases of conflict, in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality in line with standard practice by courts and EU case law.’27 One 
is left wondering how the consolidation of the Court’s case-law into EU law would 
enhance the level of protection of the right to strike in Member States.28 As we 
shall see in the next section, it is not surprising that some national parliaments 
reacted against the codification of the Court’s case-law, given that enshrining this 
standard of protection in EU law means, for certain countries, to lower the bar of 
protection for labour rights.
The most ‘innovative’ provision of the regulation foresees a new role for the 
social partners at the EU level, in particular in the definition of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms to resolve labour disputes. Article 3(2) states that ‘manage-
ment and labour at European level may, acting within the scope of their rights, 
competences and roles established by the Treaty, conclude agreements at Union 
level or establish guidelines with respect to the modalities and procedures for 
mediation, conciliation or other mechanisms […] with a cross-border character’. 
As it has been noted, it is unclear ‘to what extent these procedures would have 
been uniformly available throughout the EU until the social partners had agreed 
on a proper contractual regime of alternative dispute resolutions in transnational 
labour disputes’.29 Finally, and rather revealingly for understanding where the 
Commission puts the accent, Article 4 of the proposed regulation imposes an 
26 While it is true that this article introduce a cross-proportionality test (which means that it has 
to be applied to the limitation of both economic freedoms and social rights), Catherine  Barnard has 
heavily criticized this provision for not securing that at least the essence of the right under protec-
tion should not be undermined by proportionality analysis: C. Barnard, ‘A Proportionate Response 
to Proportionality in the Field of Collective Action’, 37 European Law Review (2012) p. 117.
27 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 12.
28 For an explanation (followed by a strong criticism) of how this article entrenches the primacy 
of economic freedoms in proportionality analysis see K. Ewing, ‘The Draft Monti II Regulation: An 
Inadequate Response to Viking and Laval’, Institute for Employment Rights, 2012, <www.lcdtu.
org/the-draft-monti-ii-regulation-an-inadequate-response-to-viking-and-laval/>, visited 10 March 
2013.
29 F. Fabbrini and K. Granat, ‘“Yellow Card, But No Foul”: The Role of the National Parlia-
ments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the 
Right to Strike’, 50 Common Market Law Review (2013) p. 20.
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obligation upon each Member State, to inform other affected Member States and 
the Commission in those cases where ‘serious acts or circumstances affecting the 
effective exercise of the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide ser-
vices which could cause grave disruption to the proper functioning of the internal 
market and/or which may cause serious damage to its industrial relations system 
or create serious social unrest in its territory or in the territory of other Member 
States’. It is a rather vague statement and it is not clear why the Commission should 
be informed so that it can ensure that a restriction of the economic freedoms does 
not go beyond what is permitted. Overall, Article 4 does not enhance legal cer-
tainty and opens up a space for further intrusion of the Commission in the na-
tional labour market.
Reasoned opinions by national parliaments
An analysis of the reactions of the national parliaments shows that some parlia-
ments actually stretched the letter of the EWS in order to be able to put forward 
a considered opinion. In fact, if the system were to be interpreted literally, the 
aspirations of national parliaments to voice their concerns would probably be 
frustrated and national parliaments’ role would be reduced to a formal and thin 
control on the exercise of European powers. This is a self-defeating logic because 
it attributes to quintessentially political institutions a competence on subsidiarity 
which is a-political in nature. In light of this consideration, it is not surprising, 
then, that parliaments have tried to seize the opportunity of using reasoned opin-
ions as a reaction against a Commission’s proposal touching upon one of the na-
tional constitutional essentials. If this is indeed the real incentive for the parliaments 
to oppose the Commission proposal, more yellow cards should be expected in the 
future.30 
In the case of the Monti II regulation, before the deadline of 8 weeks had ex-
pired, 12 national parliaments issued negative reasoned opinions: 7 from unicam-
eral parliaments (14 votes) and 5 bicameral (5 votes). Other parliaments sent 
reasoned opinions after the deadline. The Czech Senate, for example, issued a 
negative reasoned opinion beyond the deadline; the German Bundesrat and the 
Slovenian parliaments issued a negative opinion but they did not declare the 
proposal contrary to the principle of subsidiarity.31 These parliamentary chambers 
reacted simply against the Commission’s project of regulating the right to collec-
30 Another yellow card was triggered in October 2013 on the Commission proposal for the in-
stitution of the European Public Procurator Office: Com(2013) 534. In this case, the Commission 
reviewed its proposal and decided to keep it in its original formulation.
31 To be fair, they all declare that their scrutiny was not focussed on subsidiarity review, but on 
the content of the proposal.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 06 May 2014 IP address: 130.209.6.42
98 Marco Goldoni EuConst 10 (2014)
tive action at the European level by declaring their opposition.32 The Polish Sen-
ate too sent a reasoned opinion when the deadline had already expired, but it 
found a breach only of the principle of proportionality, but not of subsidiarity. 
Even a quick reading of the reasoned opinions shows that the majority of par-
liamentary chambers have reacted in a rather negative way even when they have 
not found a clear breach of the principle of subsidiarity. In fact, the main concern 
expressed by national parliaments was that this proposal ‘might destroy well-func-
tioning national arrangements in the area of labour law’.33 The main fear here 
comes across as evident: as underlined by the Belgian Chambre des Représentants, 
labour law is a national question par excellence and cannot be transferred to the 
European Union.34 National parliaments are directly stating their worries about 
the centrifugal effect for their national labour laws caused by a European interven-
tion with an instrument like a Council regulation. The problem here is twofold. 
First, the decision to regulate the right to collective action is perceived as a threat 
to constitutional essentials by many Member States.35 For example, the Portuguese 
Assembleia da República has clearly stated that ‘reconciling social rights and eco-
nomic rights in the context of fundamental rights conflict with Portuguese con-
stitutional tradition and with the interpretation followed by the jurisprudence of 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court and in legal theory generally’.36 The French 
Senate has even proposed a reformulation of Article 2 of the regulation in order 
to make it compatible with the principle of subsidiarity.37 Second, the use of a 
Council regulation, which will be directly applicable in every Member States, does 
not seem to be the best instrument to ensure that the proposal respects ‘not only 
the autonomy of the social partners, but also the different social models and the 
diversity of industrial relation systems in the Member States’.38 As aptly noted by 
32 Kiiver has rightly proposed that all reasoned opinions should contain a clear statement on 
the respect or violation of subsidiarity: The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity, 
supra n. 3, p. 198-199.
33 Reasoned opinion of the Finnish Folketinget, 3 May 2012, p. 2.
34 Avis de subsidiarité, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 30 May, DOC 53 2221/001.
35 Note that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a clause that protects national and constitu-
tional identity. On the controversial interpretation of this clause see T. Kostadinides, ‘Constitutional 
Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework of National 
Constitutional Settlement’, 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2012) p. 195.
36 Reasoned opinion of the Assembleia do Republica, 18 May 2013.
37 This is the wording proposed, in French, by the French higher chamber: ‘L’exercice de la 
liberté d’établissement et de la libre prestation des services énoncées par le traité respecte le droit 
fondamental de mener des actions collectives, y compris le droit ou la liberté de faire grève’. This is 
a quite interesting move because Protocol No. 2 does not say anything about potential contribution 
to the content of the Commission’s proposal expressed in reasoned opinions. Note also, that the 
French Senate is usually considered one of the most active parliamentary chambers in the European 
Union.
38 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 11.
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Malta’s parliament, the instrument of regulation is highly invasive and, given the 
content of the proposal, may disrupt the autonomy of the national social partners 
and more generally of national labour law. Article 3 of the proposal is also seen by 
some parliaments as a threat to national autonomy in regulating the labour mar-
ket. The Swedish Riksdag, in its reasoned opinion, stresses that ‘the proposed 
dispute resolution mechanisms could interfere with the well-functioning domes-
tic models for dispute resolution […] arrangements for the settlement of disputes 
of this nature must be considered part of national labour market models that 
should not be regulated at EU level’.39 The Danish Folketing considered the 
change of the existing national mechanisms of dispute settlement unnecessary, as 
the national provisions worked correctly. Concerning this article, the French Sen-
ate has noted that the only provision that would be compatible with the principle 
of subsidiarity would be one along the lines of the ‘Monti Clause’, that is, a provi-
sion that would immunise the right to strike from the direct and indirect effects 
of European legislation.40
It was also predictable that the vast majority of reasoned opinions would focus 
on the legal basis of the proposed regulation. Given that Article 153(5) TFEU 
introduces a categorical exclusion of the right to strike from the jurisdiction of the 
European Union, the Commission needed to find a way to circumvent this legal 
hurdle. The Commission based its argument on two points: the first is that the 
case-law of the CJEU has changed the interpretation of the Treaty by recognising 
that the right to strike is a European fundamental right; second, and as a conse-
quence, Article 153(5) has to be read as a prohibition to harmonize labour law 
and not as a categorical exclusion of the right to strike. Therefore, Article 352 
(flexibility clause) is proposed as the legal basis for this proposal. However, many 
reasoned opinions contain a criticism of the lack of a clear objective for the pro-
posal. The House of Commons contested the necessity of acting and also added 
that there was no evidence of the urgency and necessity of EU intervention. The 
perception of the need for the Commission to ‘express a more committed political 
approach’41 should not be considered, according to the House of Commons, as 
a replacement of evidence of necessity for the EU to act.42 And obviously, if the 
39 Riksdag Committee on the Labour Market, Satement 2011/12.
40 The original Monti Clause was introduced into the so-called ‘Monti Regulation’ on the free 
movement of goods in 1998. Art. 2 of the Regulation reads: ‘This Directive may not be interpreted 
as affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, includ-
ing the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems 
in Member States’: Council Regulation 2679/1998 on the functioning of the internal market in 
relation to the free movement of goods among Member States.
41 Explanatory memorandum, supra n. 19, p. 5.
42 The House of Commons’ reasoned opinion also contains a quote from the Impact Assessment 
Board, which, in its report of 21 Dec. 2011, judged the Commission’s proposal as unnecessary: 
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proposal’s aim is to clarify the legal situation after the controversy stirred by the 
case-law of the CJEU, then many parliaments rightly believe that this regulation 
would not achieve this result. In fact, if the controversy and the lack of certainty 
surrounding the labour law cases was generated by the application of proportion-
ality to arbitrate between economic freedoms and fundamental rights, then how 
it is possible to clarify the legal situation by simply ratifying in Article 2 the case-
law of the Court (with a language directly taken from Viking). The Finnish Eduskun-
ta, for example, states that the criteria set out by Article 352 TFEU were 
‘manifestly not fulfilled’ by the regulation.43 Following the same line of reasoning, 
the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés and the Portuguese Assembleia da Repub-
lica opined that Article 352 TFEU was not a justified legal basis for the proposed 
regulation.44
Representativity and the substantive use of the Early Warning 
System 
In an accurate and insightful review of the first yellow card case, Federico Fab-
brini and Katarzina Granat criticize national parliaments for their activism.45 In 
their view, the Commission’s proposal did not contain any violation of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity; therefore, national parliaments acted, so to say, ultra vires. 
The national legislatures basically misunderstood the spirit and the letter of the 
EWS. Contrary to non-formalist interpretations of the subsidiarity review,46 Fab-
brini and Granat put forward a narrow reading of the EWS: according to them, 
this kind of instrument should be limited to the material and procedural dimen-
sions of subsidiarity review. The material aspect of subsidiarity can be verified 
‘While the [Commission’s] revised report presents the problem relating to the right of collective 
bargaining and action separately, and designs alternative policy options, it does not fully separate 
the set of corresponding objectives for the issue. The Report still does not clarify why this problem 
is being addressed at the same time as revising the Directive on posting of workers, and fails clearly 
to demonstrate the necessity and proportionality of legislative EU action in this matter.’
43 Reasoned opinion of the Eduskunta, 16 May 2012. In the same reasoned opinion, the 
Finnish parliament stated that the proposal ‘overlooks the regulation’s correspondence with the pro-
visions on the right of collective industrial action guaranteed in fundamental rights instruments ap-
proved by the United nations, the International Labour Organization and the Council of Europe’. 
The Latvian Saeima also emphasized possible conflicts with the Council of Europe’s framework of 
social rights protection.
44 Reasoned opinion of the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés, 15 May 2012.
45 F. Fabbrini and K. Granat, ‘“Yellow Card, But No Foul”, supra n. 29, p. 28.
46 By providing persuasive reasons, Kiiver argues that in practice it is impossible to detach the 
principle of subsidiarity from the other two principles (of conferral and of proportionality) stated in 
Art. 5 TEU: Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity. Constitutional Theory 
and Empirical Reality, supra n. 3, p. 98-100.
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through an assessment of the ‘national insufficiency test’ and the ‘comparative 
efficiency test’ as stated by Article 5(3) TEU. According to the first test, the EU 
can act only when the objectives of the proposed action cannot be achieved by the 
Member States alone.47 The second test indicates that ‘the EU should not act un-
less it could better achieve the objectives of the proposed action’.48 The proce-
dural dimension concerns the duty of the Commission to justify its proposals by 
supporting them with reasons and indicators which should be contained in ex-
planatory memorandums, impact assessments and recitals of the proposal’s pre-
amble.49 Fabbrini and Granat propose that ‘national parliaments could take these 
assessments into account as a benchmark to assess the conformity of the proposal 
with the procedural aspect of the principle of subsidiarity’.50 But by containing 
the intervention of national parliaments to these material and procedural dimen-
sions of subsidiarity review, they state that the EWS should not address ‘the con-
tent of a legislative draft, its proportionality or the correctness of its legal basis’.51 
In fact, by interpreting the scope of the EWS in this narrow sense, one is left with 
a feeling that an opportunity to politicise the dialogue between the Commission 
and national parliaments is missed. According to this reading of the EWS, the 
subsidiarity review revolves more around checking whether the Commission pro-
posal ticks all the right procedural boxes rather than engaging in the political 
evaluation of the principle of subsidiarity. From a strictly formalist reading of 
Protocol No. 2 this is a correct interpretation. But then, what would be the point 
(and the added value) of investing the time and resources of a political institution 
in such a narrow and legalistic review? 
A more charitable and productive reading of the EWS can be adopted by un-
derstanding it as part of a larger picture. This reading interprets the EWS in the 
wider context of the Lisbon Treaty and as part and parcel of a commitment to 
enhance representative democracy within the Union. Article 10 TEU makes an 
explicit reference to the importance of representative democracy. As reminded at 
the outset of this article, the protocol on the role of national parliaments and the 
protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality have to be read against the background 
of Article 10 TEU. Note also that Article 4(2) TEU explicitly protects national 
and constitutional essentials. It is not yet clear how this article has to be inter-
preted. While national constitutional courts may be well placed as protector of 
constitutional essentials, nothing prevents national parliaments from exercising 
this role too. This would be even more appropriate in countries which do not have 
47 R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 250.
48 R. Schütze, supra n. 47,
49 19th Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, July 2012, 
COM(2012) 373, final, p. 3.
50 Fabbrini, Granat, supra n. 29, p. 11.
51 Fabbrini, Granat, supra n. 29, p. 9.
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a strong and rich tradition of constitutional justice. Furthermore, it is also coher-
ent for national parliaments to check whether the proposal of the Commission is 
compatible with the principle of conferral or not. Since as a question, subsidiar-
ity emerges once the principle of conferral has been respected, it is reasonable to 
leave to parliaments the possibility of expressing their concerns on the legality of 
the Commission’s proposal. 
A final consideration concerning the nature of subsidiarity review is in order. 
While analytically it remains possible to distinguish between narrow and wider 
readings of the principle of subsidiarity, in practice this delimitation trivializes 
subsidiarity review. This is because if understood in a thin fashion as simply a 
question of which level should decide on what, subsidiarity is reduced to a techni-
cal exercise of competence review and it betrays, by institutional design, a pro-
European centripetal prejudice. Furthermore, it is often the case that subsidiarity 
review does not raise the question of the legitimacy of the objective stated in the 
Commission’s proposal. Under this guise, subsidiarity check begins at a later stage 
and asks simply what is best suited to reach the unquestioned objective. Therefore, 
once established that an objective related to the realisation of the common market 
has to be reached at the European level, by definition the European Union will be 
better placed to achieve this task. Last but not least, the only check on the respect 
of the principle of subsidiarity is left to the CJEU: not only this institution has a 
pro-European bias, but one could reasonably argue that this kind of ex post review 
comes in when it is too late, in particular for concerns related to social issues.52
A political interpretation of subsidiarity review53 would provide a potential 
antidote to Member States to react against the centripetal proposals coming from 
the Commission. Social policies are among the most salient political issues and 
they have often been the sources of conflict when they have threatened social 
rights.54 Particularly instructive has been the case of what has been aptly defined 
as the ‘infiltration of competition law into national labour law’.55 Note that the 
conflict between economic freedoms and labour law is exacerbated by the peculiar-
ity of the material European constitution. This is based on an original split between 
market integration and social protection, that is, between the economic and the 
social constitution. It is the outcome of a shaky compromise in an area in which 
52 On the limits of ex post and judicial control of subsidiarity see D. Chalmers et al., European 
Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2010), p. 364-369.
53 Note that this interpretation, as reminded in the previous section, can be supported on the 
legal basis provided by the Treaties. 
54 The reasons that make a European social market impossible have been pinpointed by 
F. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetries of European Integration, or Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market 
Economy’, 8 Socio-economic Review (2010) p. 211.
55 S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom from the European Perspective (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2006), p. 155.
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the process of integration has been mainly negative (that is: it has interpreted 
national regulation as an obstacle). As Christodoulidis phrases it, the risk for ‘the 
national systems of employment regulation [is to be] undercut, their viability 
threatened by the unblinking focus on freedom of goods and services, capital and 
labour. As a direct result of the separating off of the economic from the means to 
redress political and social deficits, legitimation questions are divorced from the 
effects of economic performance and its distributional outcomes’.56 
The reaction of national parliaments against the proposed Monti II regulation 
is an instantiation of a major concern about the integrity (already affected) of their 
labour markets. Many of them, though not all, to be fair, note the risk of a ‘race 
to the bottom’ affecting wages and conditions of work. Hence, the claim by parlia-
ments that the regulation of the right to collective action (and one must add, the 
regulation of collective bargaining), given the current circumstances, ought to 
remain within national jurisdictions. In order to understand why the role played 
by national parliaments in this case is to be appreciated as a defence of the na-
tional labour law system it is opportune to stress the social preconditions under 
which parliamentary political representation has developed.57 
In the tradition of European modern politics, political representation has been 
organised mainly around the division of labour; the social arrangements created 
by conflict between different social interests have shaped the political constitution 
and provided the material pre-condition for its democratic legitimacy.58 This 
feature of modern European constitutionalism had an impact both on the idea of 
lawmaking as mainly legislation and as parliaments being the main forum for 
political accountability. Political constitutionalists have convincingly stressed the 
priority of one or the other function.59 However, they have not fully explored the 
link between political representation and the social context.60 In fact, they both 
take political equality as the core of the political constitution, but their understand-
56 E. Christodoulidis, ‘Minefield of Misreckonings: European Constitutional Pluralism’, 14 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 131. The disarticulation between the economic and 
the political constitution is potentially destructive for the national welfare systems precisely because 
‘the social question becomes categorically distinct: a matter that can and should be dealt with at 
an appropriate level, even if the disarticulation is precisely what so substantially undercuts the pos-
sibilities of redress, offering too little, too late’.
57 One caveat has to be introduced at this stage: the argument proposed in this section is based 
on the premise that certain representative mechanisms are not available at the European level. 
58 J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 80.
59 One is represented by R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 
2007); the other one by A. Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon 2003).
60 To be fair, the social question is almost invisible in the writings of political constitutional-
ists. This is reflected in the rather formalistic understanding of political equality that they are keen 
to protect. For an exception, see J. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’, 45 Modern Law Review 
(1979) p. 1.
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ing of it is rather thin and formal.61 It basically amounts to the recognition of the 
equal right to vote. Obviously, even political constitutionalists have to admit that 
this right needs to be embedded in a larger institutional structure which is com-
prised, predictably, by majority rule and fair electoral competition among political 
parties.62 In this way, political representation is understood mainly as a process 
of authorisation63 which shows, also, by being a fair procedure, equal respect to 
citizens. However, political representation, while clearly also a procedure of au-
thorisation, involves a more complex relationship between the rulers and the ruled, 
which includes not only the political system, but also civil society.64 Political rep-
resentation can be defined as the transmission belt between civil society and the 
political system.65 A political understanding of representation does not collapse 
either in complete adhesion or in an unbridgeable gap,66 but representativity 
emerges as a ‘continuing and mediated relation between situated citizens and 
representatives’.67 
The social question has often been central to political conflict and since at least 
the rise of the distinction between left and right, it has been the main axis upon 
which the spectrum of many European political systems has spanned.68 In this 
sense, representativity prevents the distance between social and political systems 
from becoming unbearable. This is realised by opening up channels of communi-
cation of the two systems which allows the formation and expression of judgments 
by the actors involved in the political process.69 With all their limits, these chan-
61 For the purposes of this article, I will therefore stick to a more descriptive understanding of 
political constitutionalism, one which is more attentive to the material dimension of the political 
constitution. See, in the European context, M. Wilkinson, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the 
European Union’, 76 Modern Law Review (2013) p. 191.
62 This view is also advocated by J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 
1999), p. 98-100. 
63 Note that political constitutionalists understand the political process in an instrumental way 
as the most valuable device for addressing disagreement and political conflict. For a classic state-
ment of this view see B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (Continuum 2008) (new edn.).
64 This complex bundle of relationships has been explored by J. Mansbridge, ‘Rethinking Rep-
resentation’, 97 American Political Science Review (2003) p. 515.
65 Cf., I. Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press 1990), p. 136-141 
(it contains an interesting analysis of the ‘social perspective’).
66 For an analysis of these two poles see C. Mortati, La costituzione in senso materiale (The Mate-
rial Conception of the Constitution) (Giuffré 1998), p. 115-120. For an understanding of politi-
cal representation as ‘aesthetic gap’ (and not mimetic identity) which demarcates the distinction 
between representatives and represented, see F. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics (Stanford University 
Press 1997), p. 46-47.
67 N. Urbinati, Representative Democracy (Chicago University Press 2006), p. 50.
68 See, among many contributions, N. Bobbio, Destra e sinistra (Right and Left) (Donzelli 
1993). 
69 N. Urbinati, supra n. 67, p. 51.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 06 May 2014 IP address: 130.209.6.42
105The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation
nels of communication have been put in place by European States, at least after 
WWII, through their own political systems.70 These were based on a socio-polit-
ical compromise which provided, either by collective laissez-faire or through State 
intervention, the possibility for staging a social and political conflict between 
management and labour.71 The decoupling of the economic and the social consti-
tution exercises a centrifugal force which is detrimental to those constitutional 
essentials concerning the Welfare State. 
In light of what has been noted in this section, it is possible to envisage a role 
for national parliaments as the main guarantor of certain tenets (mainly, social 
rights) of their own social systems. These tenets are an essential part of the na-
tional constitutional culture and they are usually the outcomes of social and po-
litical struggles. As long as no equivalent stage for organising a political conflict 
around social questions at the European level will be available,72 it is up to the 
most representative national political institutions to provide a communicative 
channel between conflicts in the social sphere and the political system. Too many 
necessary features are missing at the European level in order to get a proper forum 
for tackling with social questions: no authentic European trade unions, huge 
disparities in the political economies within the European Union and no Euro-
pean political representative system. Finally, a caveat needs to be made here, before 
moving to the next section, just in order to avoid any misunderstanding. It is 
necessary to stress that this reading of the role of national parliaments is not part 
the debate on which kind of institution better protect social rights, whether courts 
or legislatures.73
The politics of the Early Warning System
Despite the recognition of the role national parliaments might be playing in pro-
tecting national constitutional essentials through the subsidiarity check, a final 
cautionary remark is in order with a view to understanding the nature of the EWS 
and its impact on the system of inter-institutional relations within the European 
Union.74 While overall the previous paragraphs have promoted a rather ‘expansion-
70 T. Judt, Post-War (Vintage 2005), p. 345-360.
71 A. Somek, Engineering Equality (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 11-15.
72 For more skepticism on this point see P. Mair, Ruling the Void (Verso 2013); W. Streeck, 
Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso 2014). I would like to thank an 
anonymous reviewer for having brought this question to my attention.
73 This topic would obviously deserve a separate treatment. See, most recently, the penetrating 
analysis by J. King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012) and K. Young, Consti-
tuting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford University Press 2012).
74 I hereby refer to the idea of constitutional system as developed by J. Dickson, ‘Towards a 
Theory of European Legal Systems’, in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical Founda-
tions of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 25-53.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 06 May 2014 IP address: 130.209.6.42
106 Marco Goldoni EuConst 10 (2014)
ist’ reading of the first yellow card, it has to be noted that the kind of politics that 
the EWS generates is still far from being satisfactory from the normative perspec-
tive of political constitutionalism. How shall we interpret the EWS in light of this 
first yellow card? The EWS should be read as an invitation to national parliaments, 
and to their EACs in particular, to investigate, judge, influence and censure the 
legislative proposals of the Commission. It is a form of power: as the case of the 
Monti II regulation shows, parliaments can influence the legislative process by 
making dissatisfaction with the Commission’s proposal visible. They have a chan-
nel for staging their dissent. However, this power remains, so to say, negative in 
nature because of two reasons, one legal, the other political: first, the yellow and 
the orange cards do not amount to a formal veto power; second, and more impor-
tantly, national parliaments do not act as a collective agent, that is, they do not 
represent a separate third chamber.75 
This means that the triggering of a yellow card is not the outcome of a coordi-
nated and collective effort by national parliaments, but of the mere aggregation 
of their individual preferences. It is probable that negative reasoned opinions 
against the proposals of the Commission will be motivated by different or even 
conflicting reasons. In this way, while the EWS provides a system of influence on 
the Commission’s legislative drafts, this does not represent a way for parliaments 
to influence the substance. The EWS can be interpreted as a way to contribute to 
a common understanding of subsidiarity based on national political preferences 
on issues that ought to be treated carefully by the Commission. 
A confirmation of the negative character of the EWS can be found by looking 
at the interaction between the Commission and national parliaments in this case 
study. As rightly noted by Fabbrini and Granat,76 from a constitutional perspec-
tive, it is regrettable that the Commission withdrew its proposal without engaging 
with the parliaments’ opinions. But the regret is not due to the fact that the Com-
mission withdrew the proposal even though it did not consider the principle of 
subsidiarity violated. It is that the opportunity was missed to have an institu-
tional exchange between the Commission and national parliaments on a matter 
of substance like the right to strike.77 Had the Commission decided to review the 
draft of the Council regulation, as a matter of fact, it would have been possible to 
evaluate the substantive contribution of national parliaments to the modification 
75 See, for an argument in this direction, I. Cooper, ‘A Virtual Third Chamber for the European 
Union? National Parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 35 West European Politics (2012) p. 441.
76 Fabbrini and Granat, supra n. 29, p. 28.
77 Gavin Barrett has noted that the Commission had by that time realised that there was no 
support in the Council for any intervention on the right to collective action: G. Barrett, ‘Monti II: 
The Subsidiarity Review Process Comes of Age’, 19 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law (2012) p. 599.
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of the proposal and how this would have been synthesised by the Commission.78 
The decision to abandon the proposal was based on the acknowledgement of sup-
port for this proposal. So, the European Commission did not even try to modify 
its draft in order to obtain a different and more acceptable outcome, by for ex-
ample declaring that the balance between the right to strike and the economic 
freedoms ought to be reversed. It is a missed chance both for the content of the 
proposal and also as a way to politicise the subsidiarity check performed by parlia-
ments. Instead, the Commission stated in its reply to the parliaments, sent on 12 
September 2012, that it was not convinced of any violation of subsidiarity, but 
given that Article 352 TFEU requires unanimity, the opposition from national 
parliaments had made clear that this was an impossible requirement to obtain.79 
In this sense, the EWS was understood as a metric for expressing the discontent 
toward an already unpopular proposal.80
In conclusion, the first case of yellow card confirms that it is difficult to think 
of the EWS as a means for coping effectively with the democratic deficit. In a 
recent article, Pieter De Wilde has shown that even in the case of the Monti II 
regulation, which was able to antagonize many of the social forces involved in the 
process, the larger public, even at the national level, was left unaware.81 Nonethe-
less, the EWS may introduce some limit to the emptying of the national political 
constitutions. Rebus sic stantibus, the most charitable interpretation of the EWS 
sees it as a political instrument (based on legal provisions) for national parliaments 
to use the subsidiarity check as a way (a) to contain the unwarranted expansion 
of EU competences;82 and (b) avoid negative effects of EU competences upon 
78 Think, for example, at the many references to international law (ILO, ECHR) that were 
contained in the reasoned opinions. The Commission could have redrafted its proposal by taking 
into account the standards set by these international sources.
79 In the letter sent to national parliaments, the Commission confirms that it ‘has taken careful 
note of the views expressed as well as the current state of play of the discussions on the draft Regu-
lation among relevant stakeholders, in particular the European Parliament and Council. Against 
this background, the Commission recognises that its porposal is unlikely to gatherthe necessary 
political support within the European Parliament and Council to enable its adoption. In view of 
this, the Commission would hereby like to inform you of its intention to withdraw its proposal for 
a Regulation.’ 
80 It was quite evident that the proposal would not have obtained unanimity in the Council, 
particularly after the election of the new French President in April 2012.
81 P. De Wilde, ‘Why the Early Warning Mechanism Does Not Alleviate the Democratic Defi-
cit’, OPAL Paper Online (2012) p. 17. The author draws a negative conclusion on the EWS, affirm-
ing that it obfuscates representative democracy and it strengthens the wrong kind of involvement 
from national parliaments.
82 Cf. the three challenging proposals put forward by S. Gerben, ‘The Competence Conun-
drum’, on file with author.
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national constitutional essentials.83 It is, in other terms, an instrument which may 
serve to preserve a truly representative political space of action at the national 
level.
83 In this way, the EWS could be also read as a means to avoid the creation of national social 
deficits: see C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formal Law and the Social Deficit of Eu-
ropean Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 36 European 
Law Review (2011) p. 1.
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